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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the potential impact on First Amendment free-speech
jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on text, history, and
tradition in 2022 decisions such as New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. In
Bruen, the Court embraced a new test for examining Second Amendment cases. It
concentrates on whether there is a historical tradition of regulating the conduct in
question, and it eliminates any use of constitutionally common means-end standards of
review such as strict and intermediate scrutiny. Those two scrutiny standards often
guide the Court’s free-speech decisions. The Bruen majority, however, asserted that its
novel Second Amendment test eliminating their usage actually “comports” and “accords
with” how the Court protects free-speech rights. This Article initially illustrates how that
assertion is partly correct but largely inaccurate. It then explores critical problems that
likely would arise were the Court to impose its text, history, and tradition methodology
from Bruen on First Amendment speech cases. In doing so, the Article addresses how
this originalistic approach might affect the continued viability of the Court’s actual malice
standard in defamation law adopted nearly sixty years ago in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.

2
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INTRODUCTION
In 2022, the United States Supreme Court held in New York State Rifle & Pistol
Association v. Bruen1 that a New York licensing statute restricting public carriage of
firearms for self-defense violated the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.2 In
penning the Court’s opinion for the six-Justice conservative majority, Justice Clarence
Thomas fashioned a new test for discerning when the Second Amendment is violated.3
Thomas explained that if the “plain text” of the Second Amendment “covers” the
conduct in question, then the conduct is presumptively safeguarded and governmental
authority over it is permitted only when a “regulation is consistent with this Nation’s
historical tradition.”4 Justice Thomas stressed that in determining if a firearm regulation
is constitutional, the Court will not apply a constitutionally common means-end test such

1

142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022).

2

The Second Amendment provides that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free

State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. The
Second Amendment was incorporated in 2010 through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to
protect against state laws that restrict an individual’s right to possess a handgun in their home for selfdefense purposes. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). In Bruen, the Court went further,
holding “that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual’s right to carry a handgun for
self-defense outside the home.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2122.
3

See infra notes 4–15 and accompanying text (addressing the test).

4

Id. at 2126; see also id. at 2129–30 (“When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s

conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its
regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation.”).

3
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as strict or intermediate scrutiny.5 Those two standards focus on the strength of the
government’s interest underlying a regulation and on how carefully crafted the
regulation is in serving that interest.6 Instead of adopting such a methodology, Justice
Thomas wrote that the government now must “identify an American tradition justifying”
the regulation.7 That squares with Justice Thomas’s long-standing reliance on history to
resolve other constitutional issues, including ones affecting the First Amendment

5

Id. at 2129. The notion that means-end tests are constitutionally common is supported by Justice Stephen

Breyer’s dissent in Bruen, where he observed that “beyond the right to freedom of speech, we regularly use
means-end scrutiny in cases involving other constitutional provisions.” Id. at 2176 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6

To pass strict scrutiny review, as that standard applies in free-speech cases under the First Amendment,

a statute must use “the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.” McCullen v.
Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014). See United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (noting
that under strict scrutiny, a statute “must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government
interest. . . . If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use
that alternative”).

Under intermediate scrutiny, the government must demonstrate an important,

significant or substantial interest and that the means chosen to achieve that interest do not burden
substantially more speech than is necessary. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017);
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26–27 (2010). See also Alex Chemerinsky, Tears of Scrutiny,
57 TULSA L. REV. 341, 346 (2022) (“Intermediate scrutiny asks the government to show that the law is
narrowly tailored to serve an important government interest. Strict scrutiny, the most demanding method
of review, asks whether the challenged law is necessary to effectuate a compelling government interest.”);
R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny, Intermediate Review, and
“Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 293 (2016) (noting that under intermediate scrutiny, the
“government ends” must be “important / significant / substantial,” while the means must “not [be]
substantially more burdensome than necessary to advance those ends”).
7

Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2156.

4
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freedom of speech.8 It also aligns with Justice Thomas’s prominence as an originalist, 9
although originalism has multiple varieties.10

8

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “Congress shall make no

law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free
Press Clauses were incorporated nearly 100 years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause as fundamental liberties governing the actions of state and local government entities and officials.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). Several examples exist of Justice Thomas’s originalist
approach to First Amendment free-speech cases. See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2059
(2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the Court’s decision in favor a public school student’s First
Amendment right to engage in offensive language while off campus, and reasoning that “[a] more
searching review reveals that schools historically could discipline students in circumstances like those
presented here” and that “the majority entirely ignores the relevant history”); Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n,
564 U.S. 786, 835, 839 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the Court’s decision striking down a
California statute that restricted minors’ access to violent video games, and contending that “the historical
evidence here plainly reveals” that “‘[t]he freedom of speech,’ as originally understood, does not include a
right to speak to minors without going through the minors’ parents or guardians”); Morse v. Frederick, 551
U.S. 393, 419 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In light of the history of American public education, it cannot
seriously be suggested that the First Amendment ‘freedom of speech’ encompasses a student’s right to
speak in public schools.”); see also Michael R. Ulrich, Second Amendment Realism, 43 CARDOZO L. REV. 1379,
1401 (2022) (describing Justice Thomas as “a fervent proponent of using history”). Justice Thomas’s focus
on history in cases such as Mahanoy, Brown and Morse mentioned in this footnote comports with his embrace
of originalism when interpreting the U.S. Constitution. See Derigan Silver & Dan V. Kozlowski, The First
Amendment Originalism of Justices Brennan, Scalia and Thomas, 17 COMMC’N. L. & POL’Y 385, 396 (2012) (noting
that Justice Thomas “has embraced originalism as an approach to constitutional interpretation,” and
adding that “[l]egal scholars have also strongly associated Justice Thomas with the originalist movement”);
see also Vikram David Amar, Morse, School Speech, and Originalism, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 637 (2009)
(critiquing Justice Thomas’s use of originalism in Morse); William C. Nevin, In the Weeds with Thomas: Morse,

5
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In short, the Bruen majority’s approach to Second Amendment cases focuses first
on the amendment’s “plain text”11 and then, if the regulated conduct is covered by it, on
“this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”12 Justice Brett Kavanaugh,
concurring in Bruen, crisply encapsulated this as a “text, history, and tradition test.”13 It
is a standard that, while serving on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
Justice Kavanaugh contended should replace the use of strict or intermediate

in Loco Parentis, Corporal Punishment, and the Narrowest View of Student Speech Rights, 2014 BYU EDUC. & L.
J. 249, 251 (characterizing Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Morse as “fundamentally originalist”).
9

See Joel K. Goldstein, Calling Them as He Sees Them: The Disappearance of Originalism in Justice Thomas’s

Opinions on Race, 74 MD. L. REV. 79, 79 (2014) (“During his first two decades on the Court, Justice Clarence
Thomas has been associated with originalism and is often viewed as its leading judicial proponent. Justice
Thomas has linked originalism with the effort to limit judicial discretion and to promote judicial
impartiality.”); Lee J. Strang, The Most Faithful Originalist?: Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, and the Future of
Originalism, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 873, 876 (2011) (noting that Justice Thomas “has consistently
advocated originalist constitutional interpretations” and contended that the Court “that the Supreme Court
clear away accumulated nonoriginalist precedent to make room for the Constitution's original meaning”).
10

See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for

Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 7 (2011) (“There are multiple strands of originalism, with
additional versions proliferating as rapidly as law reviews can publish them.”); Thomas B. Colby & Peter
J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 245 (2009) (asserting that “there are today countless variations
of originalism, and the differences among them are sometimes so stark that it is difficult to treat them as
one coherent interpretive methodology”).
11

Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2135.

12

Id.

13

Id. at 2161 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

6
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scrutiny.14 It also mirrors the test Justice Thomas articulated in his 2020 dissent from the
Court’s denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Second Amendment case of Rogers
v. Grewal. 15
Justice Stephen Breyer, authoring a dissent in Bruen for a bloc of three liberalleaning Justices, criticized the majority’s “rigid history-only approach.”16 He called it
“anomalous,”17 pointing out that it did not comport with the common use of means-end
standards such as strict and intermediate scrutiny in First Amendment free-speech
cases.18 Others have joined the dissenters’ criticism of the Court’s analytical approach in
Bruen. For example, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky argues that the problem with any historycentric methodology is that “[n]o constitutional analysis can make sense when it focuses
exclusively on history, such as the conditions of 1791 when the 2nd Amendment was

14

Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (holding there is “little

doubt that courts are to assess gun bans and regulations based on text, history, and tradition, not by a
balancing test such as strict or intermediate scrutiny”).
15

140 S. Ct. 1865, 1865 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

16

Id. at 2174 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

17

Id. at 2177.

18

Id. at 2176 (observing that “beyond the right to freedom of speech, we regularly use means-end scrutiny

in cases involving other constitutional provisions”). Strict scrutiny also applies in cases brought under the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct. 2407, 2426
(2022) (“Under the Free Exercise Clause, a government entity normally must satisfy at least ‘strict scrutiny,’
showing that its restrictions on the plaintiff’s protected rights serve a compelling interest and are narrowly
tailored to that end.”).

7
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adopted, to decide what regulations can be allowed now in a vastly different society.”19
Chemerinsky also criticizes Bruen for expressly scrapping any balancing of the interests,
such as weighing public safety goals against Second Amendment rights.20
The Court in 2022 additionally emphasized the primacy of history, historical
practices, and original meaning in determining when the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause is violated.21 The six-Justice majority in Kennedy v. Bremerton School
District22 embraced this approach, killing off the three-part test in Lemon v. Kurtzman23 in
the process.24 The half-century old Lemon test, which had commanded courts to analyze

19

Erwin Chemerinsky, Forget History. Forget Safety. The Supreme Court Prizes Unfettered Gun Rights Above All

Else, L.A. TIMES (June 23, 2022), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2022-06-23/supreme-courtconcealed-carry-gun-rights-decision.
20

Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court Gun Ruling Puts Countless Firearms Regulations in Jeopardy, ABA J.

(June 29, 2022), https://www.abajournal.com/columns/article/chemerinsky-supreme-court-gun-rulingputs-countless-firearms-regulations-in-jeopardy.
21

The First Amendment provides in relevant part that “Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause has been incorporated to
apply to state and local government entities and officials through the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause. Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
22

142 S. Ct. 2407 (2022).

23

403 U.S. 602 (1971).

24

Kennedy, 142 S. Ct. at 2427 (explaining the Court had “long ago abandoned Lemon”) (citing Lemon v.

Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)). In addition, Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote a concurrence joined by Justice
Thomas in Shurtleff v. City of Boston, 142 S. Ct. 1583 (2022), stressing the importance of a “historically
sensitive understanding of the Establishment Clause.” Id. at 1610 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). They added
that “a proper application of the Establishment Clause” requires “a careful examination of the
Constitution’s original meaning.” Id. at 1609.

8
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whether a statute has “a secular legislative purpose”25 and whether the means serving it
produce an excessive entanglement between government and religion,26 entailed a
variation of balancing and means-end scrutiny.27 But Justice Gorsuch wrote for the
Kennedy majority that the Lemon test had been replaced by a historical-practices-andunderstanding methodology,28 stating “this Court long ago abandoned Lemon and its
endorsement test offshoot.”29 Writing for the three-Justice dissent in Kennedy, Justice
Sonia Sotomayor criticized the majority’s “history-and-tradition test” for analyzing

25

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.

26

Id.

27

The Lemon test represents a means-end test because it focuses on the fit between the government’s

asserted interest or objective (i.e., its end) and the rule’s methods and terms for carrying it out (i.e., its
means). See Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2177 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Judges understand well how to weigh a law’s
objectives (its ‘ends’) against the methods used to achieve those objectives (its ‘means’).”); Brnovich v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2364 (2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing a “means-end
standard” as one that evaluates the “fit between means and end – that is, between the terms of the rule and
the State’s asserted interest”); see also Rodney J. Blackman, Showing the Fly the Way Out of the Fly-Bottle:
Making Sense of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 285, 296 (1994) (noting that the Lemon
test “seemingly reflects a balancing approach in dealing with the Establishment Clause”).
28

See Kennedy, 142 S. Ct. at 2428 (asserting that “[a]n analysis focused on original meaning and history . . .

has long represented the rule” in Establishment Clause cases).
29

Id. at 2427. To support his assertion that Lemon was dead, Gorsuch cited Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572

U.S. 565 (2014), which held that the constitutionality of legislative practices must be evaluated “‘by
reference to historical practices and understandings.’” Id. at 576 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573, 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in party)). Under the
endorsement test, the Court “paid particularly close attention to whether the challenged governmental
practice either has the purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion.” County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592.

9
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Establishment Clause cases.30 She derided it for “elevating history and tradition over
purpose and precedent” and for offering “essentially no guidance for school
administrators.”31
Adding to this emphasis on history and tradition during the Court’s 2021 term, of
course, was the majority opinion overruling Roe v. Wade32 in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s
Health Organization.33 In holding that the right to obtain an abortion was not a
fundamental liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the six-Justice majority was “guided by the history and tradition that map the essential
components of our Nation’s concept of ordered liberty.”34 It concluded that abortion was
not historically and traditionally protected in the United States, thus allowing the Court
to erase Roe and the federal constitutional right to obtain an abortion.35

30

Kennedy, 142 S. Ct at 2450 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Sotomayor also called the majority’s rejection of the

Lemon test and endorsement inquiry “erroneous, and despite the Court’s assurances, novel.” Id. at 2447.
31

Id. Justice Neil Gorsuch, in a concurrence joined by Justice Thomas in Shurtleff v. City of Boston, 142 S. Ct.

1583 (2022), decided shortly before Kennedy in the 2021 Term, likewise emphasized the importance of a
“historically sensitive understanding of the Establishment Clause.” Id. at 1610 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
There, they argued that “a proper application of the Establishment Clause” requires “a careful examination
of the Constitution’s original meaning.” Id. at 1609.
32

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

33

142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).

34

Id. at 2248. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part that states shall not “deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
35

Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2253–54 (“The inescapable conclusion is that a right to abortion is not deeply rooted

in the Nation’s history and traditions. On the contrary, an unbroken tradition of prohibiting abortion on
pain of criminal punishment persisted from the earliest days of the common law until 1973.”).

10
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Furthermore, just as Justice Thomas began his new framework for Second
Amendment rights in Bruen by focusing on whether an amendment’s “plain text covers
an individual’s conduct,”36 so too did the Dobbs majority begin its analysis with “the
constitutional text.”37 Writing for the Dobbs majority, Justice Samuel Alito found “no
express reference to a right to obtain an abortion,”38 which then led him to concentrate on
history and tradition, as described immediately above.39
What might this vigorous, laser-like focus on text, history, and tradition in Second
Amendment, Establishment Clause and Substantive Due Process cases mean for the
future of First Amendment free-speech disputes? It is an exceedingly relevant and
important question. That is partly because Justice Thomas in Bruen asserted that the
Court’s new test for Second Amendment disputes “accords with how we protect other
constitutional rights,” including “the freedom of speech in the First Amendment.”40 In
other words, he contended that a text, history, and tradition approach agrees with how
speech is protected.
Part I of this Article explains that Justice Thomas’s assertion here is partly correct,
but largely wrong.41 The Article then addresses what might happen, however, if the
conservative majority in Bruen were to graft or otherwise superimpose its Second
Amendment framework on First Amendment free-speech cases going forward. Part II

36

Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2126.

37

Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2245.

38

Id.

39

Supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.

40

Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2130.

41

Infra notes 50–119 and accompanying text.

11
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initially explores problems that would result from applying the first part of the Bruen
test—namely, determining whether the “Second Amendment’s plain text covers an
individual’s conduct”42—in free-speech cases that would similarly query whether the
First Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s speech.43 Under this first step, if the
expression at issue “falls beyond the Amendment’s original scope,” then the expression
is “categorically unprotected,” and the analysis stops.44 Part II then turns to the back-half
of the Bruen framework, addressing likely difficulties in searching for historical and
traditional regulatory analogues to support new restrictions on speech and contemporary
communication technologies.45
Part III then illustrates how Bruen’s text, history, and tradition methodology might
be applied if the Court were to reconsider—as Justices Thomas and Gorusch have
repeatedly urged—the actual malice standard established for public-official defamation
cases in the landmark decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.46 To wit, Justice Thomas
in 2021 pointed to the “lack of historical support for this Court’s actual-malice
requirement,”47 while in 2019 he found “little historical evidence suggesting that the . . .

42

Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2129–30 (emphasis added).

43

Infra notes 120–241 and accompanying text.

44

Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2126.

45

Infra notes 120–241 and accompanying text.

46

See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that the First Amendment

mandates “a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual
malice’”); infra notes 242–284 and accompanying text.
47

Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2425 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting

Tah v. Global Witness Publ’g, Inc., 991 F.3d 231, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (Silberman, J., dissenting)).

12
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actual-malice rule flows from the original understanding of the First or Fourteenth
Amendment.”48 Despite Justice Thomas’s arguments that Sullivan should be overruled,
the Article argues that such an outcome is far from clear, given the Court’s failure to
articulate clear guidance for conducting a text, history, and tradition inquiry. Finally,
Part IV concludes by synthesizing the Article’s analysis and by pointing out that the
Court’s relatively youthful, six-Justice conservative majority may well have plenty of
opportunities over the next decade or so to refine and firmly insert its preferred text,
history, and tradition methodology into First Amendment free-speech jurisprudence.49

I. JUSTICE THOMAS’S TENUOUS ANALOGY IN BRUEN TO FIRST AMENDMENT
FREE-SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE: SOMEWHAT CORRECT, LARGELY WRONG
Prior to the Court’s 2022 ruling in Bruen, lower courts had “coalesced around a
‘two-step’ framework for analyzing Second Amendment challenges that combines
history with means-end scrutiny.”50 Under this approach, courts would first rely on
historical evidence to determine whether the regulated conduct fell outside of the Second
Amendment’s scope.51 If the regulated conduct was outside of it, then it would not be
protected. Under the second step, if the historical evidence was either inconclusive or
demonstrated that the conduct was protected, then the courts would conduct either a

48

McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 676 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).

49

Infra notes 285–293 and accompanying text.

50

Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2125; see also id. at 2174 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[E]very Court of Appeals to have

addressed the question has agreed on a two-step framework for evaluating whether a firearm regulation
is consistent with the Second Amendment”).
51

Id. at 2126.

13
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strict or intermediate scrutiny means-end inquiry, with strict scrutiny being reserved for
regulations coming close to the “core” Second Amendment right of protecting selfdefense in the home.52 Those two means-end standards focus on the strength of the
government’s interest underlying a regulation and on how carefully crafted the
regulation is in serving that interest.53
In Bruen, however, the Court held that “despite the popularity of this two-step
approach, it is one step too many.”54 Justice Thomas explained that if the “plain text” of
the Second Amendment “covers” the conduct in question, then it is presumptively
safeguarded and government control over it is permissible only when the “regulation is
consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition.”55 He acknowledged difficulties with
historical analysis, but argued it was “more legitimate, and more administrable, than
asking judges to ‘make difficult empirical judgments’ about ‘the costs and benefits of
firearms restrictions,’ especially given their lack of expertise in the field.’”56 Thomas
added that judicial deference to legislative interest-balancing is misplaced; instead, the
Court must defer to “the balance [] struck by the traditions of the American people.”57

52

Id.

53

See supra note 6 (addressing both strict and intermediate scrutiny).

54

Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2127.

55

Id. at 2126; see also id. at 2129–30 (“When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s

conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its
regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation.”).
56

Id. at 2130 (quoting McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 790–91 (2010)).

57

Id. at 2131.

14
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Bruen’s methodology comports with Justice Thomas’s prominent stance as an
originalist.58 Of course, originalism comes in multiple varieties,59 and Thomas has not
consistently embraced a particular form of it.60 Regardless, it suffices to say that Thomas
has long deployed the use of text, history, and tradition when resolving constitutional
issues, including ones affecting the First Amendment freedom of speech.61
In Bruen, the Court was clear that text, history, and tradition – not balancing –
would define the analysis of Second Amendment rights. But in the course of reaching
this conclusion, Thomas made the remarkable statement that the Court’s new test for
Second Amendment disputes “accords with how we protect other constitutional rights,”
including “the freedom of speech in the First Amendment.”62 In drawing this connection
between the Court’s First and Second Amendment methodologies, Justice Thomas wrote
that the Court’s current formula for determining whether a category of expression falls
outside the scope of First Amendment protection centers on whether that category
historically and traditionally has been prohibited.63 Justice Thomas’s assertion here is
partly correct, but largely wrong, as this Part describes.64 He is correct on the narrow
point that the Court uses history and tradition to define new categories of unprotected or

58

See supra note 9 and accompanying text (addressing Justice Thomas’s originalist position).

59

See supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting there are several versions of originalism).

60

Justice Thomas’s use of history and tradition is considered in more detail in Part III.

61

See supra note 8 and accompanying text (addressing Justice Thomas’s originalistic reliance on history for

reaching conclusions in free-speech cases).
62

Id. at 2130.

63

Id.

64

Infra notes 65–114 and accompanying text.

15
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lesser-protected expression.65

He is not correct, however, that the Court’s First

Amendment jurisprudence has foresworn balancing.
The Supreme Court held in 1942 that some varieties of speech are not safeguarded
by the First Amendment.66 Nearly seventy years later, the Court explained in United
States v. Stevens67 that when carving out a new category of unprotected expression from
the First Amendment, it would not use “a simple balancing test” that, on an ad hoc basis,
weighs the “relative social costs and benefits” of safeguarding the speech in question.68
Instead, there must be a “long-settled tradition of subjecting [the] speech to regulation.”69

65

See infra notes 67–79 and accompanying text (noting how the Court uses history and tradition to

identify unprotected categories of expression.
66

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). The Court wrote in Chaplinsky that “[t]here are certain

well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.” Id. at 571–72. It explained that among these unprotected
categories of speech are “the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’
words – those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace.” Id. at 572. Other varieties of speech today also fall outside the sweep of First Amendment
protection, such as fraud, incitement, child pornography, and speech that is integral to criminal conduct.
See Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2361 (2020) (Breyer, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (“The Court has held that entire categories of speech – for example, obscenity, fraud,
and speech integral to criminal conduct – are generally unprotected by the First Amendment entirely
because of their content.”); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) (“The freedom of
speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation, incitement,
obscenity, and pornography produced with real children.”)
67

559 U.S. 460 (2010).

68

Id. at 470

69

Id. at 469.
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In short, as Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the eight-Justice Stevens majority, the
precluded category of speech must have been “historically unprotected,” even if the
Supreme Court had not addressed it.70 To be sure, the Court conceded that it had not
always been clear that history and tradition governed its analysis of unprotected
categories, noting it “has often described historically unprotected categories of speech as
being of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”71 The Court
asserted, however, that “such descriptions [of the Court’s approach] are just that—
descriptive.”72 Stevens’ methodology, as Professor Wayne Batchis observes, therefore is
rooted in “the history and tradition rubric.”73
The Court reiterated this historical approach for identifying categorical carveouts
in 2011 in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association.74 Justice Antonin Scalia reasoned
for the Brown majority that there must be “a historical warrant” to preclude a variety of
speech from First Amendment protection.75 He added that this requires “persuasive

70

Id. at 472.

71

Id. at 470 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

72

Id. at 470–71 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

73

Wayne Batchis, On the Categorical Approach to Free Speech – and the Protracted Failure to Delimit the True

Threats Exception to the First Amendment, 37 PACE L. REV. 1, 27 (2016). Samuel Alito, the lone dissenting
Justice in Stevens, argued that the restrictions on animal crush videos were constitutional under the logic of
the Court’s ruling in the child pornography case of New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). See Stevens, 559
U.S. at 497 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that Ferber controlled the analysis). Although Justice Alito noted
that all fifty states ban animal cruelty, id. at 491, he did not rely on a history-and-tradition analysis.
74

564 U.S. 786 (2011).

75

Id. at 792.
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evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized)
tradition of proscription.”76 Justice Scalia suggested that courts should focus on whether
there is “a longstanding tradition in this country” of restricting access to the particular
species of content.77 As Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the plurality in 2012 in
another case, unprotected categories of speech all have “a historical foundation.”78 The
Court again reaffirmed this principle in 2015.79
The Court has also examined history and tradition in other isolated cases,
particularly in recent years, although its invocation of such arguments is inconsistent at
best and typically is coupled with other methodological approaches.

In Houston

Community College System v. Wilson,80 for example, a unanimous Court relied extensively
on history and tradition in holding that the public censure of a member of a community
college’s board of trustees did not give rise to a First Amendment retaliation claim.81
Justice Gorsuch, authoring the majority opinion, held that “[w]hen faced with a dispute
about the Constitution’s meaning or application, long settled and established practice is
a consideration entitled to great weight.”82 The Court did not stop with a history and

76

Id.

77

Id. at 795.

78

United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718 (2012).

79

Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 446 (2015) (observing that “a history and tradition of regulation

are important factors in determining whether to recognize ‘new categories of unprotected speech’”)
(quoting Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 791 (2011)).
80

142 S. Ct. 1253 (2022).

81

Id. at 1264.

82

Id. at 1259.
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tradition analysis, however; it also noted that “[w]hat history suggests, we believe our
contemporary doctrine confirms.”83
The Court has taken, or at least incorporated elements of, a history-and-tradition
approach in only a handful of other contexts. Perhaps the most notable area is the public
forum doctrine, where the Court asks whether government property has historically and
“time out of mind” been made available to the public for expressive purposes.84 The
Court also incorporates a historical inquiry as one of several factors when determining
whether the government speech doctrine applies.85
Likewise, the Court has included a historical inquiry in its test for the right of
access to government proceedings. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the Court
held that the public has a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.86 In recognizing this new constitutional right, the
Richmond Newspapers plurality traced the history of the modern criminal trial from “the
days before the Norman Conquest” to colonial America to demonstrate that “throughout
its evolution, the trial has been open to all who care to observe.”87 The plurality also cited
Matthew Hale, William Blackstone, and Jeremey Bentham, as well as other observers,

83

Id. at 1260.

84

Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679-80 (1992) (holding airport terminals are

not public fora).
85

See, e.g., Shurtleff v. City of Boston, 142 S. Ct. 1583, 1589 (2022) (noting, among other considerations, that

the Court examines “the history of the expression at issue” in deciding whether it constitutes government
speech); Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 209-11 (2015) (considering
the history of license plates in determining if they are government speech).
86

Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).

87

Id. at 564 (Burger, C.J., plurality).
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who noted that the openness of criminal trials in the United States was “indispensable”
for “the proper functioning of a trial.”88 In his concurrence, Justice Brennan suggested a
two-prong test for right-of-access claims that a majority of the Court later embraced: (1)
whether there is a historical tradition supporting public access; and (2) whether granting
access to a particular government proceeding serves a specific structural value.89
In perhaps a crucial deviation from the text, history, and tradition approach,
however, the Court did not base its decision on text at all. Instead, it held that although
a right of access is not explicitly mentioned in the First Amendment, the right is essential
for “other First Amendment rights” because it safeguards ‘‘a major purpose of that
Amendment . . . to protect the free discussion of government affairs.’”90 Furthermore, the
Richmond Newspapers test does not rely on history alone; it plainly includes both historical
and balancing elements.
Other times, history and tradition arguments have popped up in concurring and
dissenting opinions. For example, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,91
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion does not rest its analysis on history and tradition,
relying instead on precedent and First Amendment theory to reject restrictions on
independent corporate election expenditures.92 But Justice Stevens (joined by Justices

88

Id. at 569-70 (Burger, C.J., plurality).

89

Id. at 589 & 598 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596

(1982); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478
U.S. 1 (1986).
90

Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).

91

558 U.S. 310 (2010).

92

See infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text (describing how the majority reached its decision in

Citizens United).

20

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4277611

Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor) and Justice Scalia (joined by Justices Thomas and
Alito) argued about the relevance of history and tradition in separate opinions. Justice
Stevens, perhaps in an effort to beat the conservatives at their own game, asserted that at
the founding, very few corporations existed, and the Framers “took it as a given that
[they] could be comprehensively regulated in the service of the public welfare.”93 In
response, Justice Scalia averred that Justice Stevens improperly “ignores the Founders’
views about other legal entities that have more in common with modern business
corporations than the founding-era corporations.”94

Again, however, history and

tradition did not drive the majority decision in Citizens United, which instead relied
extensively on an interpretation of precedent that prohibits distinctions among
speakers,95 as well as speech restrictions intended to balance out the marketplace of
ideas.96
In sum, Justice Thomas is correct that history and tradition play a fundamental
role in free-speech jurisprudence, at least when it comes to deciding if a variety of speech
falls beyond the reach of First Amendment protection. History also arises in a handful of
special First Amendment contexts, such as the public forum doctrine, the government
speech doctrine, and the right of access to government proceedings. Furthermore, the
Court sometimes has mentioned history as part of a more extensive analysis.97

93

Id. at 427-28 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

94

Id. at 388 (Scalia, J., concurring).

95

Id. at 340-41.

96

Id. at 349 (rejecting the “antidistortion” rationale).

97

See, e.g., Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Wilson, 142 S. Ct. 1253 (2022).
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That, however, is where the use of a history-and-tradition methodology typically
ends in free-speech cases; it does not usually extend into the analysis of whether a
regulation imposed on a protected variety of speech is constitutional.98 Specifically, if the
speech in question does not fall into an unprotected category – in other words, if it is
presumptively safeguarded by the First Amendment – then the constitutionality of a
government regulation imposed on it hinges on whether the regulation passes muster
under a means-end test such as strict or intermediate scrutiny.99 Justice Breyer pointed

98

See infra notes 99–102 and accompanying text (addressing the means-end standards that apply in First

Amendment speech cases to discern whether a regulation imposed on presumptively protected speech
passes constitutional muster).
99

Under this methodology, the overarching principle is that content-based statutes are subject to strict

scrutiny while content-neutral statutes face intermediate scrutiny.

See Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol.

Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2346 (2020) (“Content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny. . . . By contrast,
content-neutral laws are subject to a lower level of scrutiny.”) (internal citation omitted); see also David S.
Han, Middle-Value Speech, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 68 (2017) (noting that “the longstanding default rule of First
Amendment doctrine” is that “outside of the low-value speech categories, content-based restrictions on
speech are evaluated under strict scrutiny, which effectively dooms them to failure”); R. Randall Kelso,
Justifying the Supreme Court's Standards of Review, 52 ST. MARY’S L. J. 973, 1016 (2021) (observing that
“regulations of speech in a public forum or on private property that are content-neutral receive
intermediate review”); Helen Norton, Manipulation and the First Amendment, 30 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J.
221, 241 (2021) (noting that regulations “characterized as content-neutral receive ‘only’ intermediate
scrutiny, as compared to the strict scrutiny generally applied to the government’s content-based regulation
of protected speech”). The Court has also embraced amorphous balancing tests in some recent high-profile
decisions. See, e.g., Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021) (holding 8-1 that punishing a student
cheerleader for her Snapchat stating “fuck cheer” and “fuck everything” was unconstitutional); Walker v.
Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200 (2015) (considering several factors in holding
that Texas’s specialty license plates are government speech).
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this out in his Bruen dissent.100 In addition, in some instances where speech is restricted
or compelled, an even more lenient third tier of means-end review that approaches
rational basis is applied.101

This tiers-of-scrutiny framework in free-speech cases

migrated from Equal Protection Clause cases, starting in the 1970s.102
All three tiers of scrutiny (strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and something
akin to rational basis review) possess two things in common. Namely, they focus on: 1)
the government’s interest in regulating speech – whether it is compelling, significant,

100

See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2176 (2022) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting

that “if conduct falls within a category of protected speech, we then use means-end scrutiny to determine
whether a challenged regulation unconstitutionally burdens that speech”); see also id. at 2174 (“Although I
agree history can often be a useful tool in determining the meaning and scope of constitutional provisions,
I believe the Court’s near-exclusive reliance on that single tool today goes much too far.”).
101

The Supreme Court has adopted reasonableness standards that approach the deferential level of rational

basis review in cases involving: 1) inmate speech rights; 2) student speech rights; and 3) situations where
advertisers are compelled to disclose factual information. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006)
(observing “that restrictive prison regulations are permissible if they are ‘reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests’ . . . and are not an ‘exaggerated response’ to such objectives”) (quoting Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987)) (internal citation omitted); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
273 (1988) (holding that “educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”); Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. of Sup. Ct.
of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (holding that when the government compels an advertiser to disclose
purely factual, “an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are
reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers”).
102

See Robert Post, NIFLA and the Construction of Compelled Speech Doctrine, 97 IND. L.J. 1071, 1081 (2022)

(asserting that the “tiers-of-scrutiny framework . . . in the early 1970s began to infiltrate First Amendment
doctrine from the distant field of Equal Protection jurisprudence”).
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important, substantial or legitimate; and 2) the precision of the fit between the statute’s
terms and the government’s interest – whether the statute restricts no more speech than
is necessary to serve the interest, whether it burdens substantially more speech than is
necessary, or whether there simply is a reasonable relationship between the means and
the end.103 In short, they all entail means-end review and balancing of interests.104 The
fact that Justice Thomas in Bruen jettisoned from the Second Amendment framework the
use of any tier of scrutiny, however, is somewhat unsurprising. That is because he
previously has derided tiers of scrutiny as easily manipulable, non-Constitutionally
prescribed tests that allow judges to implement their policy preferences in any given
case.105

103

See supra notes 6 and 101 (describing the requirements of strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and

reasonableness review in First Amendment speech cases).
104

See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 122 (2013) (observing that “[t]he traditional tiers of

scrutiny all involve some degree of interest-balancing”); Edward V. Heck, Constitutional Interpretation and
a Court in Transition: Strict Scrutiny from Shapiro v. Thompson to Dunn v. Blumstein – and Beyond, 3 USAFA J.
LEG. STUD. 6567 (1992) (asserting “that strict scrutiny is merely one distinctive form of ‘means-end
scrutiny’”); Nelson Lund, The Proper Role of History and Tradition in Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 30 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 170, 190 (2020) (noting that “means-end analysis” may be “conducted under the
rubric of intermediate and strict scrutiny”); Andrew White, In Defense of Self and Home: The Problems With
Limiting Second Amendment Rights for Young Adults Based on Their Age, 90 U. CIN. L. REV. 1241, 1249 (2022)
(“Currently, there are three primary levels of means-end scrutiny commonly applied by courts: rationalbasis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.”).
105

Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. 582, 638–41 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice

Thomas wrote in Hellerstedt that:
the label the Court affixes to its level of scrutiny in assessing whether the government can
restrict a given right – be it “rational basis,” intermediate, strict, or something else – is
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Indeed, Justice Thomas’s 2022 dissent in the First Amendment free-speech case of
City of Austin v. Reagan National Advertising of Austin106 – a dissent penned merely two
months before he authored the majority opinion in Bruen – makes it abundantly clear that
Justice Thomas fully understands that history and tradition generally play a limited role
in free expression cases while means-end scrutiny is a large and essential component.
The Court in City of Austin considered whether a municipal ordinance that treated onpremises signs differently from off-premises ones was content based or content neutral
and, in turn, whether it was subject to strict scrutiny or intermediate review.107
Justice Thomas in City of Austin objected to the majority’s methodology for
determining whether a law is content based or content neutral.108 In doing so, he cited
the Court’s ruling in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association to support the
proposition that “history and tradition are relevant to identifying and defining”109
unprotected categories of speech.110 As noted earlier, he is spot-on regarding the role that

increasingly a meaningless formalism. As the Court applies whatever standard it likes to
any given case, nothing but empty words separate our constitutional decisions from
judicial fiat.
Id. at 638.
106

107

142 S. Ct. 1464 (2022).
See id. at 1475–76 (concluding that the sign ordinance was content neutral and thus subject to

intermediate scrutiny, and remanding the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to
determine if the ordinance would survive intermediate scrutiny).
108

See id. at 1481 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority adopted “an incoherent and malleable

standard” for distinguishing content-based laws from content-neutral laws).
109

Id. at 1490.

110

See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text (discussing Brown).
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history and tradition play in this categorical-carveout process.111 He then stressed,
however, that history and tradition should play no role in determining whether a
regulation on presumptively protected speech is content based or content neutral.112
Furthermore, Justice Thomas readily acknowledged that content-based regulations on
speech “may generally be upheld only if the government proves that the regulation is
narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”113 In short, he recognized that they
are subject to a means-end, strict-scrutiny analysis.114
Before turning to Part II’s examination of some probable pitfalls of applying a
version of the Court’s Bruen-based Second Amendment jurisprudence in First
Amendment free-speech cases, it is worth noting that the use of means-end review in
free-speech cases was contested by at least one former Justice in the not-too-distant past.
Specifically, Justice Anthony Kennedy asserted in 1991 that strict scrutiny “has no real or
legitimate place when the Court considers the straightforward question whether the State
may enact a burdensome restriction of speech based on content only, apart from any

111

See supra notes 66–79 and accompanying text (discussing unprotected categories of speech and the role

that history and tradition in identifying new categories of speech that not shielded by the First
Amendment).
112

See City of Austin, 142 S. Ct. at 1490 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that “content neutrality . . . is an

empirical question, not a historical one,” and adding that “the majority’s historical argument is not only
meritless but misguided”).
113

Id. at 1482.

114

See id. at 1484 (“In sum, the off-premises rule is content based and thus invalid unless Austin can satisfy

strict scrutiny.”).
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considerations of time, place, and manner or the use of public forums.”115 Noting that the
Court had imported strict scrutiny “from our equal protection jurisprudence,”116 Justice
Kennedy contended that “[b]orrowing the compelling interest and narrow tailoring
analysis is ill advised when all that is at issue is a content based restriction” because “the
test might be read as concession that States may censor speech whenever they believe
there is a compelling justification for doing so.”117 Pushing back against the use of strict
scrutiny as a form of “ad hoc balancing”118 that invites further encroachments on free
speech, Justice Kennedy preferred a bright-line rule – namely, that “raw censorship based
on content . . . [is] forbidden by the text of the First Amendment and well-settled
principles protecting speech and the press.”119 Kennedy’s position, albeit articulated in a
concurrence rather than a controlling opinion, might gain new traction today in a
constitutional world where text, history, and tradition are increasingly valued and
means-end review is disparaged.
With this in mind, the next Part examines difficulties that likely would arise were
the Court to import its text, history, and tradition methodology from Bruen into First
Amendment speech cases.

115

Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124 (1991) (Kennedy,

J., concurring).
116

Id.

117

Id.

118

Id. at 127.

119

Id. at 128.
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II. PROBLEMS WITH IMPOSING A PLAIN-TEXT COVERAGE MANDATE AND
A HISTORY-AND-TRADITION APPROACH ON FREE-SPEECH CASES

The first part of the Bruen framework involves determining whether “the Second
Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct.”120 If it does, then the conduct is
presumptively protected by that amendment.121 To address this issue in Bruen, the Court
focused on the Second Amendment’s phrase “the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms” and, specifically, whether the petitioners were covered by “the people” and
whether the “definition of ‘bear’ naturally encompasses public carry.”122
What might happen if this threshold “plain text” step were applied to First
Amendment speech cases? The plain text admonishes that “Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech.”123 For the last 100 years, the Court has all but
ignored the plain language of the First Amendment. It also has rarely relied extensively
on history in determining the constitutionality of speech regulations. This Part explores
what a text, history, and tradition approach in First Amendment cases might look like.
A.

Threshold Issues
Before discussing the application of Bruen’s “coverage” approach to free-speech

questions, it is worth noting the full ramifications of text-first approach to expressive
rights were the Court to embrace it wholeheartedly. At least three items are crucial here.

120

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2126 (2022) (emphasis added).

121

Id.

122

Id. at 2134–35.

123

See supra note 8 (setting forth the relevant text of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
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First, considering the amendment’s plain meaning might lead the Court to
reconsider its incorporation doctrine. In Gitlow v. New York, the Court declared nearly one
hundred years ago that “the freedom of speech and of the press . . . are among the
fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”124
Arguably, the freedoms of speech and press are individual liberty interests
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment; the fact that the First Amendment
expressly restricts the power only of “Congress” is irrelevant in defining those interests.
But the argument against incorporation, or at least in favor of different standards for
evaluating state and federal laws that abridge the freedom of speech, is not frivolous, and
the word “Congress” plays a key role. In Terminiello v. Chicago, Justice Jackson contended
in dissent125 that the Fourteenth Amendment’s terms “gave no notice to the people that
its adoption would strip their local governments of power to deal with . . . problems of
peace and order . . . . .”126 Even Justices Holmes and Brandeis suggested that while “[t]he
general principle of free speech . . . must be taken to be included in the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . perhaps it might be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of
interpretation than is allowed to Congress by the sweeping language that governs or
ought to govern the laws of the United States.”127 To be clear, no Justice on today’s Court
has expressed interest in revisiting incorporation of the First Amendment, but perhaps

124

Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).

125

337 U.S. 1, 906-07 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).

126

Id.

127

Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Justice Thomas and others would revisit Gitlow v. New York128 if the question were
squarely presented.129 If they did, then the Court might conclude the Constitution places
fewer limits on state power to restrict speech.
Second, a text-first approach might require the Court to overrule cases that
recognize rights that are not expressly covered by First Amendment’s text. For example,
the text of the First Amendment does not expressly protect the freedom of association,
yet the Court has held that “[i]t is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association
for the advancement of beliefs and ideas” is constitutionally protected.130 Likewise, and
as mentioned above, the Court relied extensively on history and tradition when
recognizing a right of access to criminal proceedings, but it did not require an explicit
textual hook for this recognition,131 explaining “we have long eschewed any ‘narrow,
literal conception’ of the Amendment’s terms.”132 Under a plain-text approach, it would

128

268 U.S. 652 (1925) (holding the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the First Amendment to apply to

the states).
129

Although Justice Thomas has argued against incorporating the Establishment Clause on the ground that

it is a “federalism provision intended to prevent Congress from interfering with state establishments,” he
has said he “accepts” the incorporation of the Free Exercise clause because it is an individual right. Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); see also Town
of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 & n.1 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(arguing against the incorporation of the Establishment Clause).
130

NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).

131

See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604 (“Of course, this right of access to criminal trials is not

explicitly mentioned in terms in the First Amendment.”).
132

Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963)).
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be irrelevant if history and tradition supported the recognition of a right, unless the Court
stretches the term “speech” to include actions that are corollaries of the speech process.133
Third, the Court would need to address whether the “freedom of speech” simply
means “freedom from prior restraints,” as William Blackstone famously asserted.134
Under this interpretation of the First Amendment, subsequent civil or criminal sanctions
for speech would not raise any constitutional issues. The Court suggested this was not
the proper reading of the First Amendment as early as 1919 in Schenck v. United States.135
Yet, it also has reasoned that preventing prior restraints “was a leading purpose in the
adoption of the constitutional provision.”136 Given that Justice Gorsuch cites Blackstone
approvingly in his 2021 Berisha dissent,137 determining whether Blackstone’s cramped
view of free speech is correct would seemingly be a necessary threshold question for the
Court under a text, history, and tradition methodology.

133

This is the approach many lower courts have taken in holding that the First Amendment presumptively

protects videotaping the police. See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012).
134

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES

OF

REFERENCE,

TO THE

CONSTITUTION

AND

LAWS,

OF THE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (St. George Tucker
ed., Philadelphia, Birch & Small, 1803).
135

249 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1919) (“It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is

not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have been the main purpose.”). See also
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931) (noting with seeming approval criticism that immunity from
prior restraints “cannot be deemed to exhaust the conception of liberty guaranteed by State and Federal
constitutions,” but holding that “[i]n the present case, we have no occasion to inquire as to the permissible
scope of subsequent punishment”).
136

Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451–52 (1938).

137

Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2426 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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Relatedly, the Court would need to address whether the “freedom of speech” and
the “freedom of the press” carry the same meaning. From the 1930s to 1960s, some Court
decisions rested on the freedom of the press.138 Since then, however, the Court has
typically rested its decisions on the Speech Clause or cited both clauses in the same
breath.139 To date, the Court typically does not give the Press Clause independent
meaning.140
On the one hand it has said that “[n]or is it suggested that news gathering does
not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”141 At the same time, the Court has
refused to give the press any specific constitutional protections because defining who
qualifies for these protections “would present practical and conceptual difficulties of the
highest order.”142 Scholars such as Eugene Volokh have argued that affording the Press
Clause a small constitutional role makes sense because it only protects technology—the

138

See, e.g., Lovell, 303 U.S. at 451–52 (holding unconstitutional licensing for the distribution of

publications); Near, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (holding that enjoining publication violated freedom of the press).
See also Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974) (citing both clauses in striking
down a right-of-reply statute).
139

For more discussion of this issue, see David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 489

(2002) (noting that “most constitutional protection of the press derives from the Speech Clause and other
constitutional provisions that apply to everyone”).
140

See Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2439 (2014) (noting the Court has

interpreted the Speech Clause expansively while largely neglecting the Press Clause).
141

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).

142

Id. at 704.
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printing press or equivalent modern communications technology.143 Other scholars such
as Sonia West assert that the Press Clause refers not merely to a form of technology but
also to speakers who gather newsworthy information, disseminate it to the public, and
check abuses of government power.144
B.

What Does “Speech” Mean and What Does It “Cover”?
Moving beyond threshold issues that would undermine most of the Court’s extant

free-expression jurisprudence, the key textual interpretative issues for the Court are the
meaning of “speech” and whether it—to use Justice Thomas’s term in Bruen––“covers”
whatever the form of communication that is at stake.145
Justice Samuel Alito, in his 2022 concurrence in Shurtleff v. City of Boston that was
joined by both Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch, wrote that “‘[s]peech,’ as that term is
used in our First Amendment jurisprudence, refers to expressive activity that is ‘intended

143

See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the

Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 463 (2012) (arguing for an interpretation of the Press Clause as
protecting “press as technology”).
144

See West, supra note 140, at 2443–44.

145

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2129–30 (2022) (holding that “that when the

Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects
that conduct”) (emphasis added). Of course, other words in the First Amendment could become important
for answering this coverage question, such as what constitutes the “press.” Although the Court has not, to
date, relied on the Press Clause in determining the scope of First Amendment rights, it is certainly possible
that the Court would one day do so. Scholars deeply disagree about the meaning of this provision. Compare
Eugene Volokh, supra note 143 (arguing that “’press” referred to a specific means of communication, the
printing press), with Sonia West, supra note 144 (arguing that the “press” referred to entities performing a
specific type of function in a democracy).
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to be communicative’ and, ‘in context, would reasonably be understood . . . to be
communicative.’”146 The problem, however, is that this definition is not what the plain
text of the First Amendment says at all. Rather, it is how the Supreme Court has
stretched, via its own interpretation, the word “speech” to encompass not just “abstract
discussion”147 but also conduct that symbolically communicates a message (i.e.,
expressive conduct).148 If the focus, however, becomes what the plain text of the First
Amendment historically or originally meant in the late 1700s and early 1800s, then
perhaps “speech” might very well include such expressive conduct.149

Under this

perspective, the plain-text meaning of “speech” is “communication,” regardless of its
form.150

146

142 S. Ct. 1583, 1598 (2022) (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468

U. S. 288, 294 (1984)).
147

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 429.

148

See Spence v. Wash., 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (holding that conduct may rise to the level of speech for

purposes of possible First Amendment protection when there is “[a]n intent to convey a particularized
message” with the conduct and when “in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it”).
149

See Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of the First Amendment, 97 GEO. L.J. 1057,

1059 (2009) (contending that “[t]he equivalence of symbolic expression and verbal expression is consistent
with the First Amendment’s original meaning”); but see Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First
Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 285–86 (2017) (arguing the Founders were concerned with protecting
“writing, publishing, and speaking” but not expressive conduct).
150

Cf. John Fee, The Freedom of Speech-Conduct, 109 KY. L.J. 81, 90 (2020) (“There are several strong normative,

practical, and historical reasons for interpreting the First Amendment as protecting a general freedom of
communication.”).
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Sometimes the Court uses the term “pure speech” in First Amendment speech
cases.151

It seemingly does this to distinguish speech from expressive conduct.152

Elsewhere, it has stated rather broadly that “the creation and dissemination of
information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.”153
In Bruen, Justice Thomas stressed that the meaning of the words in the
Constitution’s text should be “historically fixed.”154 For instance, he wrote that “the
Second Amendment’s definition of ‘arms’ is fixed according to its historical
understanding.”155 The problems then become, from a First Amendment perspective,
deciding exactly whose historical understanding of “speech” controls—is it the
understanding of the drafters and ratifiers of the First Amendment, for example, or the
understanding of the public in 1791 when the amendment was adopted or 1868 when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified?—and how, in turn, one ferrets out exactly what
their understanding was. As Ronald Collins previously has pointed out, Chaplinksy does
not explain how to conduct this historical analysis. 156 Not only is there a long list of

151

See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360, n.2 (2003) (“While it is of course true that burning a cross is

conduct, it is equally true that the First Amendment protects symbolic conduct as well as pure speech.”);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969) (observing the wearing of black
armbands “the purpose of expressing certain views” in a public school is “closely akin to ‘pure speech’
which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment”).
152

See supra notes 146–149 (addressing expressive conduct).

153

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011).

154

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2132 (2022).

155

Id.

156

Ronald Collins, Exceptional Freedom—The Roberts Court, the First Amendment, and the New Absolutism, 76

ALB. L. REV. 409, 444–45 (2013).
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possible places to search for historical evidence,157 but it is unclear how much weight to
afford each record or what to do when early historical records are nonexistent or vague.158
As Section C of Part II discusses in more detail, Bruen itself left open a multiple essential
questions for conducting an inquiry into history and tradition.159
Even in those areas of the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence where history
and tradition play a role, the Court has not made explicit how the inquiry should be
undertaken. Furthermore, some of the Justices most known for being “originalists”
disagree. For example, in the free-speech case of McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,160
Justice Thomas asserted more than twenty-five years ago that whether the freedoms of
speech and press protect a given activity—in McIntyre, it was anonymous political
leafletting—must be guided by the “original meaning” and “original understanding” of
the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses.161 For Justice Thomas in McIntyre, the key for
determining the original meaning and understanding was to examine “what the phrases
‘free speech’ or ‘free press’ meant to the people who drafted and ratified the First
Amendment.”162 As the emphasized terms in that quotation indicate, meaning is derived
from the understanding of the First Amendment’s drafters and ratifiers, not by the
meaning that the general reading public in 1791 would have ascribed to the amendment’s
words.

157

Id. at 444–45.

158

Id. at 445 (2013).

159

See supra Part II, Section C.

160

514 U.S. 334 (1995).

161

Id. at 359 (Thomas, J., concurring).

162

Id. at 370 (emphasis added).
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Justice Thomas’s originalistic methodology in McIntyre is different in this respect
from that of the late Justice Antonin Scalia, who came to focus on the original public
meaning of the text of the Constitution.163 For Justice Scalia, this allowed for some
elasticity and flexibility, in accord with a “reasonable construction” of the “original
meaning” of the text.164 Justice Scalia elaborated that “[i]n textual interpretation, context
is everything, and the context of the Constitution tells us not to expect nit-picking detail,
and to give words and phrases an expansive rather than narrow interpretation—though
not an interpretation that the language will not bear.”165 Thus, when it came to the First
Amendment’s explicit textual protections of “speech” and “press,” he asserted that those
terms were merely constituent parts representing the larger concept of “communicative
expression.”166 As such, Justice Scalia reasoned that handwritten letters, although neither
literally speech nor press, would be safeguarded from government censorship.167
Justice Scalia therefore ultimately became linked to the notion of public meaning
originalism.168 At the heart of public meaning originalism is the principle “that the
original meaning of the Constitution is the original public meaning of the constitutional

163

See Stephen M. Griffin, Optimistic Originalism and the Reconstruction Amendments, 95 TUL. L. REV. 281, 288

(2021) (noting that “original public meaning made its first appearance in a now well-known speech by the
late Justice Antonin Scalia”).
164

ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38 (1997).

165

Id. at 37.

166

Id. at 37–38.

167

Id. at 38.

168

Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Chimerical Concept of Original Public Meaning, 107 VA. L. REV. 1421, 1224–25

(2021) (calling Justice Scalia “a founding member of the public meaning originalist school”).
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text.”169 As Lawrence Solum encapsulates it, the public meaning thesis pivots “roughly
[on] the meaning that the text had for competent speakers of American English at the
time each provision of the text was framed and ratified.”170 This is different from original
intent originalism, under which “the original meaning of the constitutional text is the
meaning that the framers intended to convey.”171 Justice Scalia rejected such an original
intent perspective in favor original meaning when it came to interpreting the text of the
Constitution.172
Bruen’s plain-text approach thus would send the Justices scrambling either, per
Justice Thomas’s McIntyre opinion, to determine what “speech” meant to the drafters and
ratifiers of the First Amendment or, in accord with public meaning originalism, to figure
out what “speech” meant to a hypothetically-imagined informed reader of the First
Amendment back in either 1791 or 1868.173 To make this work in a clear and consistent
manner, of course, all of the Justices would need to agree on one approach or the other,

169

Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 933 (2009).

170

Lawrence B. Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis: An Originalist Theory of Constitutional Meaning, 101 B.U. L.

REV. 1953, 1957 (2021).
171

Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, Immersion, and the Constitutional

Record, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1621, 1627.
172

See SCALIA, supra note 164, at 38 (“What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a

statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.”).
173

See Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, The Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism,

48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 584 (2011) (asserting that “public meaning originalists treat the Constitution
primarily as a legal text, and their interpretive goal is to understand how an informed reader of the time
would have understood the legal commands it issued,” and adding that this approach “supposes . . . that
the imagined reader of the past exists in a disinterested world, detached from political commitments”).
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and such agreement currently is lacking.174 Additionally, interpreting “speech” when it
regards state regulations might require turning to the understandings of 1868 when the
Fourteenth Amendment, which makes the First Amendment applicable to states, was
adopted.175
Closely tied to the problems raised by deploying Bruen’s notion of “plain text” and
deciding what “speech” historically means in free-expression cases is the concept of
coverage. Specifically, Justice Thomas stressed that the threshold inquiry in Second
Amendment cases is whether the “plain text covers an individual’s conduct.”176 If the
conduct is covered, then it presumptively is safeguarded.177 The issue thus becomes what
Justice Thomas means by “covers.”
“Covers” seemingly refers to whether a term’s historically fixed definition can be
interpreted more expansively to encompass things that did not exist when the
Constitutional provision in question was adopted.178 To wit, Justice Thomas wrote that
“even though the Second Amendment’s definition of ‘arms’ is fixed according to its

174

See Eric Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 329, 336 (2013) (“While original-public-

meaning originalism has emerged as the favored variant in the academy today, even the judges most
committed to originalism have arrived at no such methodological consensus. The result is that even when
the Justices pursue an originalist inquiry, there remains disagreement . . . about which version to apply.”).
175

See supra note 8 (noting the First Amendment’s incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment’s

Due Process Clause).
176

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2126 (2022) (emphasis added).

177

See id. at 2129–30 (“When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the

Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.”).
178

Id. at 2132.
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historical understanding, that general definition covers modern instruments that facilitate
armed self-defense.”179
Justice Thomas suggested that this same understanding of “covers” applies in freespeech cases.180 Here, he quoted Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in the 2008 Second
Amendment case of Heller v. District of Columbia181 for the proposition that “the First
Amendment protects modern forms of communications.”182 Justice Scalia had indicated
back in 1997 in A Matter of Interpretation that, indeed, this might be the case.183
In particular, and in answering his own query regarding whether the Free Speech
Clause applies “to technologies that did not exist when the guarantee was created,”
Justice Scalia contended that “the Court must follow the trajectory of the First
Amendment, so to speak, to determine what it requires – and assuredly that enterprise is
not entirely cut-and-dried but requires the exercise of judgment.”184 More bluntly and
critically put, determining coverage can be squishy and subjective.

The notion of

“following the trajectory of the First Amendment, so to speak” intimates that the Court’s
current path of expanding the coverage of “speech” to include technologies such as video
games and the internet might very well continue for not-yet-invented methods and
modes of speech.185 In fact, in holding that video games are a protected mode of speech

179

Id. (emphasis added).

180

Id.

181

554 U.S. 570 (2008).

182

Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2132 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 582).

183

SCALIA, supra note 164, at 45.

184

Id.

185

See Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (“California correctly acknowledges that video

games qualify for First Amendment protection.”); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (involving
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in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, Justice Scalia suggested that whether a
new technology is covered by the First Amendment freedom of speech hinges on whether
it can “communicate ideas.”186
Justice Thomas’s and Justice Scalia’s conception of whether the plain text of the
Constitution covers a particular artifact – be it a modern-day firearm or a contemporary
communication technology—and therefore presumptively protects it conflicts with how
some scholars understand the notion of First Amendment coverage. Professor Frederick
Schauer explains that just because speech may be involved in a particular activity or
behavior, it does not mean that the First Amendment is implicated and applies to (i.e.,
covers) it.187 He illustrates this by noting that “laws dealing with contracts, wills, trusts,
gambling, warranties, and fraud all involve legal regimes that specify consequences,
including negative ones, for using certain words – speech – in certain ways, but routinely
present no First Amendment issues whatsoever.”188 In brief, only when a regulation of
speech triggers some heightened level of First Amendment review, such as strict or
intermediate scrutiny, can it be said that First Amendment coverage exists.189 Conversely,

regulation of speech on the internet, and concluding that “our cases provide no basis for qualifying the
level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium”).
186

Brown, 564 U.S. at 790.

187

See Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.

1613, 1619 (2015) (“If the coverage of the First Amendment were even close to the ordinary meaning of the
word ‘speech,’ then vast segments of human life would remain shielded by the First Amendment from
regulation or other legal consequences.”).
188

Id.

189

Professor Schauer elaborates that:
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when First Amendment coverage does not exist, then, as Professor Mark Tushnet points
out, regulations on speech are “permissible if they satisfy a standard of minimal
rationality.”190
This notion of coverage is somewhat akin to Justice Stephen Breyer’s belief that
heightened First Amendment review is not warranted simply because an economic or
social regulation affects speech, and that a more deferential form of rational basis review
is appropriate in such situations.191 It also taps into Justice Elena Kagan’s recent objection
to the majority of the Court applying heightened First Amendment scrutiny in a
challenge to a statute regulating money paid to unions by non-union members in Janus v.
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees.192 She pointed out there, in
arguing that heightened review was inappropriate and that a version of rational basis
review was warranted, that “[s]peech is everywhere – a part of every human activity
(employment, health care, securities trading, you name it). For that reason, almost all

When an act (whether a regulatory act of government or a communicative or expressive
act of a speaker) is held to implicate the First Amendment – when a First Amendmentinspired test or standard of review applies – the act can be considered to be covered by the
First Amendment. Conversely, when the First Amendment does not even apply – when a
restriction is ordinarily evaluated only in accordance with a rational basis standard – we
can say that the activity is uncovered.
Id. at 1618. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (addressing strict and intermediate scrutiny).
190

Mark Tushnet, The Coverage/Protection Distinction in the Law of Freedom of Speech – An Essay on Meta-

Doctrine in Constitutional Law, 25 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1073, 1076 (2017).
191

See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (2018) (Breyer J., dissenting)

(providing an extensive elaboration of this point throughout his dissent).
192

138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
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economic and regulatory policy affects or touches speech.”193 In sum, First Amendment
coverage is not justified merely because speech is being regulated.
Of course, were the Bruen approach to Second Amendment cases to be extended
and superimposed on First Amendment speech disputes, then no tier of heightened First
Amendment review—strict or intermediate scrutiny—would ever apply to measure a
statute’s constitutionality.194 In other words, the scholarly notion of First Amendment
coverage would be rendered nugatory. Instead, assuming that the plain text of the First
Amendment’s Speech Clause covered the expression being regulated, then—under
Bruen’s logic—it would be presumptively protected.195 The next step, per Bruen, would
entail examining the history and tradition of regulating the type of speech in question,
rather than subjecting the regulation to means-end scrutiny.196 The next section examines
what that inquiry might look like.
C.

Applying a History and Tradition Approach in Free Speech Cases
Bruen suggests that once a court determines that the plain text of the First

Amendment’s Speech Clause covers the regulated expression, it is presumptively

193

Id. at 2502 (Kagan, J., dissenting). As Justice Samuel Alito wrote for the majority, Justice Kagan and the

dissent “propose[d] that we apply what amounts to rational-basis review.” Id. at 2465.
194

See supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting how the Bruen methodology eliminates the use of means-

end tests such as strict and intermediate scrutiny).
195

The Court in Bruen reasoned that “when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s

conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,
142 S. Ct. 2111, 2126 (2022).
196

Under Bruen, “the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s

historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id.
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protected.197 For speech that is presumably protected, the next step requires examining
the history and tradition of regulating it.198 In other words, the issue under a Bruenesque
approach would become whether the specific form of regulation—albeit not a complete
ban—imposed on it had historically and traditionally been permitted.199 If the
government could demonstrate that the regulation had historically and traditionally been
allowed in the United States, then the presumption in favor of First Amendment
protection would be rebutted and such a regulation would be permissible.200
For modern-day regulations imposed on speech, Justice Thomas’s analysis in
Bruen indicates that the Court would need to search for analogies and similarities to
historical and traditional regulations.201

He elaborated that “analogical reasoning

requires only that the government identify a well-established and representative

197

The Court in Bruen reasoned that “when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s

conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,
142 S. Ct. 2111, 2126 (2022).
198

Under Bruen, “the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s

historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id.
199

Id.

200

See supra notes 67–77 and accompanying text (addressing Stevens and Brown, including the test they

fashioned for identifying unprotected categories of expression).
201

Justice Thomas explained in Bruen that:
When confronting . . . present-day firearm regulations, this historical inquiry that courts
must conduct will often involve reasoning by analogy – a commonplace task for any
lawyer or judge. Like all analogical reasoning, determining whether a historical regulation
is a proper analogue for a distinctly modern firearm regulation requires a determination
of whether the two regulations are “relevantly similar.”

Id. at 2132.
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historical analogue, not a historical twin. So even if a modern-day regulation is not a
dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass
constitutional muster.”202 Determining the representative historical analogue is easier
said than done, sparking fierce disagreement at the Court. For example, in Bruen Justice
Breyer attacked the majority for “offer[ing] many and varied reasons to reject potential
representative analogues, but very few reasons to accept them.”203
Identifying the relevant historical tradition is a familiar problem in the Court’s
substantive due process cases, where it sometimes has (and most recently did in Dobbs)
required a historical tradition to support the recognition of a substantive right.204 The
Court, or some subset thereof, asks whether the right is “rooted in our Nation’s history
and tradition and whether it is an essential component of what we have described as
‘ordered liberty.’”205
For decades, the Court has quarreled over how broadly or narrowly to define the
relevant historical tradition. Typically, the more general the relevant historical tradition,
the more likely it is that the Court will conclude that the right at issue is constitutionally
protected. Over the years, the Court has flipped back and forth on how broadly or
narrowly to define the relevant right. In Bowers v. Hardwick, for example, the Court in the
1980s took a very narrow approach, asking whether there was a history and tradition of
protecting the right to engage in sodomy, and held that there was not.206 Seventeen years

202

Id. at 2133.

203

142 S. Ct. 2180 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

204

See supra notes 33–35 (addressing Dobbs).

205

Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2246.

206

478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
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later, the Court in Lawrence v. Texas overruled Bowers, defining the relevant liberty interest
more sweepingly as the right to make choices “central to personal dignity and
autonomy.”207 Similarly, in Obergefell v. Hodges, which held that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the right to same-sex marriage, the Court defined the relevant
liberty interest was not the right to marry someone of the same sex but the right to make
“intimate choices” that “shape an individual’s destiny.”208 In Dobbs, the pendulum
swung back to a more narrow, conduct-specific definition of the relevant liberty interest.
There, the Court held that the proper inquiry is whether there is history and tradition
protecting the right to an abortion, not “the freedom to make ‘intimate and personal
choices’ that are central to personal dignity and autonomy” (as defined in Casey) or “the
right to privacy” (Roe).209
Determining the scope of the relevant history and tradition is fraught with
unresolved

methodological

complications.

With

respect

to

interpreting

the

constitutionality of laws that limit individual liberties, one of the most important issues
is whether the relevant historical time period is 1791, when the Bill of Rights was ratified,
or the 1860s, when the Fourteenth Amendment, which makes the First Amendment
applicable to the states, was ratified. In Bruen, the Court specifically declined to decide
what historical materials are determinative and which time period is most relevant.210 In

207

539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).

208

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 665–66 (2015).

209

Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2258.

210

Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2138 (acknowledging the “ongoing scholarly debate on whether courts should

primarily rely on the prevailing understanding of an individual right when the Fourteenth amendment
was ratified in 1868 when defining its scope” but declining to resolve it because “the public understanding
of the right to keep and bear arms in both 1791 and 1868 was, for all relevant purposes, the same with
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Kennedy, the Court announced that “historical practices and understandings” must
govern the resolution of Establishment Clause claims,211 but as the dissent noted, the
majority failed to offer “any meaningful explanation of this history-and-tradition test for
another day.”212 Dobbs likewise offers little meaningful guidance, given that it considers
historical evidence from the thirteenth century through the twentieth century.213
In its categorical analysis, determining the correct analogy has played a
determinative role in some free speech cases. For example, in Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Association, which centered on a law restricting minors’ access to violent video
games, the Court rejected California’s argument that the relevant historical tradition was
protecting children from harmful materials, as the Court had previously recognized in
Ginsberg v. New York.214 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in Brown, equated violent
video games with violent-themed books, movies, and comic books, which enjoyed a long

respect to public carry”); see also id. at 2162-63 (Barrett, J., concurring) (noting the Court “does not
conclusively determine the manner and circumstances in which postratification practices may bear on the
original meaning of the Constitution” or “whether courts should primarily rely on the prevailing
understanding of an individual right when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868 or when the
Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791”).
211

Kennedy, 142 S. Ct. at 2428.

212

Id. at 2450 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

213

At one point in the opinion, the Court’s attack on abortion-rights advocates suggests that the existence

(or lack thereof) of abortion laws in 1868 is most relevant. Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2254 (criticizing the abortionrights advocates for being “unable to show any evidence to show a constitutional right to abortion when
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted”).
214

Brown, 564 U.S. at 793–94 (discussing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), which upheld a state

statute regulating obscenity for minors)).
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history of constitutional protection.215 In contrast, Justice Alito’s concurring opinion
embraced the broader “harmful for minors” analogy to Ginsberg and attacked the
majority for failing to “proceed with caution” in order “to understand the new
technology.”216
The Court has struggled to determine the relevant representative analogue in prior
cases, even when it might seem that the historical precursor is obvious. In Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission, for example, Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia disagreed
about the relevant historical analogy for corporations. Stevens insisted that the Court
should look at corporations that existed in the early founding period, which, he argued,
the Framers would not have considered to have speech rights.217 In contrast, Scalia
asserted that it is inappropriate to consider those early corporate entities because they
had state-granted monopoly privileges, something modern corporations lack. As a
result, Scalia contended, it is more appropriate to consider “the Founders’ views about
other legal entities that have more in common with modern business corporations than
the founding-era corporations.”218
Lower courts currently are struggling to determine the appropriate analogy for
evaluating the First Amendment rights of social media platforms and the
constitutionality of law imposed on them. The platforms argue that they are analogous
to newspapers and other publishers that are entitled to exercise editorial control and
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Id. at 795–96 (noting the lack of a “longstanding tradition in this country of specially restricting

children’s access to depictions of violence”).
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Id. at 806 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 426–28 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 387–88 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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judgment over content, free from government interference.219 If this analogy holds, they
are entitled to the same constitutional protections established in cases like Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.220 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit emphatically
rejected this analogy in September 2022, holding that “[t]he platforms are nothing like
the newspaper in Miami Herald.”221 Instead, it concluded that the platforms are akin to
common carriers like telegraph and telephone companies.222 Conversely, the Eleventh
Circuit embraced the analogy to newspapers and emphatically rejected the analogy to
common carriers.223
In the First Amendment context, defining the relevant historical tradition broadly
or narrowly can dramatically impact whether a court finds a challenged regulation
constitutional. For example, in American Beverage Association v. San Francisco, which
considered a challenge to a required health warning on advertisements for soft drinks,
Ninth Circuit Judge Ikuta wrote a concurring opinion arguing that “only ‘health and

219

See NetChoice v. Attorney General, 34 F.4th 1196, 1208 (11th Cir. 2022) (noting that “NetChoice

responds that platforms’ content-moderation decisions—i.e., their decisions to remove or deprioritize
posts or deplatform users, and thereby curate the material they disseminate—are ‘editorial judgments’
that are protected by the First Amendment under longstanding Supreme Court precedent”).
220

418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding a right-of-reply statute unconstitutional because it interfered with the

exercise of editorial choices made by the editors of print newspapers, and reasoning that “[t]he choice of
material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the
paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials – whether fair or unfair – constitute the exercise
of editorial control and judgment”).
221

NetChoice, L.L.C. v. Paxton, _ F.4th __, 2022 WL 42285917, *13 (5th Cir. Sept. 16, 2022).

222

Id. at *25-29.
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NetChoice, LLC v. Attorney General, 34 F.4th 1196, 1210–22 (11th Cir. 2022).

49

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4277611

safety warnings long considered permissible’ would be excepted” from heightened
scrutiny.224 The language Ikuta quoted comes from the Supreme Court’s decision in
NIFLA v. Becerra,225 but Ikatu significantly changed the quotation’s meaning by adding
the qualifier “only.”226 Rather than considering the relevant historical tradition to be the
tradition of “health and safety warnings,” Judge Ikuta demanded evidence of a tradition
of health and safety warnings for soft drinks.

With this as her standard, it was

unsurprising that she concluded, that “NIFLA did not specify what sorts of health and
safety warnings date back to 1791, but warnings about sugar-sweetened beverages are
clearly not among them.”227
In addition to the difficulties of determining the relevant historical analogy, the
Court would then need to decide what to make of whatever historical evidence it could
find about that analogue. Justice Barrett’s Bruen concurrence points out “just a few
unsettled questions” that the Court did not resolve there because it did not feel the
answers would impact the case’s resolution.228 These critical questions include what are
“the manner and circumstances in which postratification practice may bear on the
original meaning of the Constitution”229; “[h]ow long after ratification may subsequent

224

916 F.3d 749, 761 (9th Cir. 2019) (Ikatu, J., concurring in part).

225

138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
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For a more thorough analysis of Judge Ikatu’s confusing opinion in American Beverage, see Claudia E.

Haupt & Wendy E. Parmet, Public Health Originalism and the First Amendment, 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231,
258–69 (2021).
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916 F.3d at 762 (Ikatu, J., concurring in part).
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142 S. Ct. at 2162–63 (Barrett, J., concurring).
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Id. at 2162.
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practice illuminate original public meaning?”230; “[w]hat form must practice take to carry
weight in constitutional analysis”231; and “whether courts should primarily rely on the
prevailing understanding of an individual right when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified in 1868 or when the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1868.”232 Justice Breyer’s dissent
noted additional unanswered questions, such as “[h]ow will judges determine which
historians have the better view of close historical questions?”233 and how many cases,
laws, or other historical examples are sufficient to show a historical tradition (and not
dismissed as “outliers”?).234
Might some version of this text, history and tradition methodology actually take
hold in First Amendment jurisprudence? In fact, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in September 2022 embraced sub silentio Bruen’s plain text approach and
expressly adopted public meaning originalism in the free-speech case of NetChoice, LLC
v. Paxton.235 That case centers on whether a Texas statute that generally bars large social
media platforms from censoring users based on their viewpoints violates the platforms’
First Amendment right of free speech.236 In analyzing the merits of the platforms’ claim,
Judge Andrew Oldham wrote for the Fifth Circuit majority that “we start with the
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Id. at 2163.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 2177 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

234

Id. at 2179.
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2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 26062 (5th Cir. Sept. 16, 2022).
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Id. at *4–8.
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original public meaning of the Constitution’s text.”237

In doing so, Judge Oldham

concentrated on how “the Speech Clause [was] originally understood.”238
Judge Oldham’s plain-text methodology is, in the authors’ view, highly unusual
for examining a First Amendment challenge to a statute.239 It may not be surprising,
however, that Judge Oldham engaged it, given his status as a conservative jurist who was
appointed to the Fifth Circuit by former President Donald Trump and who previously
clerked for Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito.240 As Vox bluntly put it, the ruling in
Paxton was issued by an “especially right-wing panel of the already conservative United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.”241 In short, conservative jurists like those
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Id. at *23.

238

Id.
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The typical methodology for examining the constitutionality of a statute regulating speech is first to

determine whether, in fact, speech (as opposed to conduct) is at issue, and then, if speech is at issue, to
determine whether it falls into an unprotected category of expression. If the speech does not fall into an
unprotected category of speech, then the focus becomes determining whether the statute regulating it – the
statute being challenged on First Amendment grounds – is content based or content neutral. The resolution
of that question then generally determines whether a court will apply strict or intermediate scrutiny to test
the statute’s constitutionality. See Clay Calvert, Curing the First Amendment Scrutiny Muddle Through a
Breyer-Based Blend Up? Toward a Less Categorical, More Values-Oriented Approach for Selecting Standards of
Judicial Review, 65 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 5–10 (2021) (explaining this categorical methodology).
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See Andrew Stephen Oldham, Federal Judicial Center, https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/oldham-

andrew-stephen.
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Ian Millhiser, Two Republican Judges Just Let Texas Seize Control of Twitter and Facebook, VOX (Sept. 19, 2022),

https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2022/9/19/23361050/supreme-court-texas-twitter-facebookyoutube-social-media-fifth-circuit-netchoice-paxton.
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in the Paxton majority may be drawn to extending Bruen’s Second Amendment
framework to free-speech cases.

III.

APPLYING TEXT, HISTORY, AND TRADITION

TO RECONSIDER NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. SULLIVAN

To understand how the Court’s text, history, and tradition methodology might
play out in First Amendment speech cases, it is useful to consider a concrete example.
Given Justice Thomas’s repeated attacks on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, it makes sense
to use defamation claims against public officials as that example.242
Sullivan considered whether the First Amendment limited the common law tort of
defamation when brought by a public official against a newspaper. L.B. Sullivan served
as a city commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama during the civil rights movement, and
his duties included overseeing the police department.243 The New York Times published a
paid advertisement placed by the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King; in an effort
to raise money for King’s legal defense, the ad detailed civil rights abuses in
Montgomery.244 Although Sullivan was not named in the ad, he argued that readers

242

This Article limits its analysis to Sullivan itself and not its progeny, which included the extension of the

actual malice requirement to public figures, see Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154 (1967) (plurality
opinion), and to claims for punitive and presumed damages in cases involving a matter of public concern,
see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (concluding that “the States may not permit recovery
of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard for the truth”).
243

376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).

244

Id.
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would attribute its criticisms of the Montgomery police department to him.245 As the U.S.
Supreme Court noted, it was “uncontroverted that some of the statements [in the
advertisement] were not accurate descriptions of events which occurred in
Montgomery.”246 Sullivan sued, alleging libel per se under Alabama common law.247 In
accordance with Alabama law, a jury rendered a verdict of $500,000 in presumed
damages, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.248 At that time, the New York Times
and other publications were facing a series of expensive defamation claims brought by
Southern public officials unhappy with the media coverage of the civil rights
movement.249
In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court held that public officials must
demonstrate “actual malice”—knowledge of falsity or reckless indifference to truth or
falsity—to succeed on defamation claims based on statements relating to their public
duties.250

Three Justices disagreed with Brennan’s analysis, contending that the

newspaper was entitled to an “absolute, unconditional constitutional right” to “criticize
officials and to discuss public affairs with impunity.”251 As Richard Epstein wrote, the
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Id. at 260–64, 270.
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Id. at 258–59.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 279–80.
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Id. at 293–97 (Black, J., concurring) (joined by Douglas); see also id. at 297–305 (Goldberg, J., concurring)

(joined by Douglas) (arguing that “the Constitution affords citizens and the press unconditional freedom
to criticize official conduct”).
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decision was a victory not only for the freedom of speech but also for the civil rights
movement.252
Justice Thomas has made clear he would overrule Sullivan because he believes the
actual malice standard that the case adopted “bears ‘no relation to the text, history, or
structure of the Constitution.’”253 He claims that Sullivan and its progeny were “policydriven decisions masquerading as constitutional law” and that the Court should consider
whether the “original meaning” of the First and Fourteenth Amendments support the
actual malice standard.254 Justice Gorsuch also has expressed the view that Sullivan is
inconsistent with the Constitution’s original meaning,255 although his arguments for
reconsidering Sullivan rest extensively on what he regards as a shifting media
landscape.256 In addition, unlike Thomas, Gorsuch professes to be less certain of the
outcome of any such reconsideration, stating he does “not profess any sure answers” and
is “not even certain of all the questions we should be asking.”257

252

Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782, 787 (1986).
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Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2425 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting

Tah v. Global Witness Publishing, Inc., 991 F.3d 231, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (Silberman, J., dissenting)).
254

McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 676 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).

255

See Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2426 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that it was the

“accepted view” in this country “for more than two centuries” that States could permit defamation actions);
id. at 2429 (“Departures [like the holding in Sullivan] from the Constitution’s original public meaning are
usually the product of good intentions.”).
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Id. at 2427–30 (arguing that “[t]he Nation’s media landscape” has changed in vast and important ways

since Sullivan was decided in 1964).
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Id. at 2430.
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As discussed in Part II, the first step in the methodology Justice Thomas sets forth
in Bruen, as applied to First Amendment issues, requires courts to consider whether the
plain text of the Constitution covers the challenged regulation. If that step is not met, the
inquiry comes to an end. If it is met, however, then courts must consider whether the
“historical tradition” supports the challenged law.258 Under this Bruenesque approach, if
the type of speech in question had not been historically and traditionally barred in the
United States, then the issue would become whether the specific form of regulation (albeit
not a complete ban) imposed on it had historically and traditionally been permitted.259
Thus, under Bruen’s text, history, and tradition approach, any reconsideration of
Sullivan would need to start with the text of the First Amendment, including the nature
of the incorporation of the First Amendment.260 If the Court refused to reconsider—or
reaffirmed—Gitlow, it would still need to address the amendment’s plain admonition that
“no law” could “abridge the freedom of speech, or of the press.” Given that any honest
plain-text approach would have trouble avoiding the clear import of “no law,” those
seeking to overturn Sullivan would want to focus on defining what the “freedom of

258

See Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2127 (“the government must affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is

part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms”); see also
id. at 2130 (if the plain text covers the conduct at issue, “[t]he government must then justify its regulation
by demonstrating that the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation”).
259

Under Bruen, “the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s

historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2126.
260

See Epstein, supra note 252, at 788 (noting the “first step” toward the constitutionalizing of common

law torts “had taken place a long time ago when the prohibitions of the first amendment were held to
apply to the states”).
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speech” and “freedom of the press” mean. As discussed in Section A of Part II,261 the
Court would first have to address Blackstonian arguments that the First Amendment
prohibits only prior restraints and not subsequent punishments.262 Because the Court
seemingly has no appetite for embracing Blackstone’s approach, notwithstanding that
both Thomas and Gorsuch favorably cite him,263 it then will need to determine whether
the freedom of speech (or the press) provides constitutional protection for defamatory
speech.264
The next question would be whether the First Amendment “covers” defamatory
statements. This is where things get particularly interesting. Defining the relevant
historical analogy at higher level of generality—for example, speech that is critical of the
government—would make it more likely for the Court to reaffirm Sullivan. Without
stating so directly, Sullivan itself took this approach by not focusing narrowly on the state
of defamation law in either 1791 or 1868, but rather on whether there is a history and
tradition of protecting false speech about the government.
Indeed, although Justice Thomas and others have criticized Sullivan for its failure
to rest its decision in history, this attack is misplaced. Justice Brennan, writing for the
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See infra notes 134–37 and accompanying text (regarding Blackstone).

262

See Epstein, supra note 252, at 791 (“The great step in New York Times was to breach the wall between

prior restraint and tort liability.”).
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Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2426 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); McKee, 139 S. Ct. at 678

(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
264

Indeed, some of the Court’s decisions in this area have left open the possibility that the press is entitled

to more extensive First Amendment protections. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S.
767 (1986) (holding that a private-figure plaintiff had the burden of proving falsity of a press defendant’s
speech about a matter of public concern).
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majority, spent several pages analyzing the nation’s early history of laws restricting
criticism of the government because the Court believed the relevant history and tradition
analogue was whether there have historically and traditionally been protections for
criticism of the government.265 As a result, Sullivan relied extensively on “the great
controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798,” which it claimed “first crystallized a national
awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment.”266
Critics of Sullivan, such as Justice Thomas, would instead search for the narrowest
relevant historical analogy possible. In his McKee opinion, Thomas contends that
evidence of a broad consensus that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional is irrelevant
because that is not equivalent to objecting to libel laws.267 Instead, Thomas points to
evidence that state common-law defamation actions existed at the founding and that, in
fact, libels against public officials were considered more serious than ordinary libels.268
Thomas also claims that criminal libel prosecutions occurred in the colonies through the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.269 He notes that the common law did not
permit truth to be a defense,270 and that while it privileged statements about a public
official’s fitness for office, this privilege applied only when the statement was true.271
Thomas also cites several opinions from the 1800s in which public officials brought

265

See Lee Levine & Stephen Wermiel, What Would Justice Brennan Say to Justice Thomas?, COMMC’N. LAW.

Spring 2019, at 1, 23 (making this observation).
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Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 273.
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McKee, 139 S. Ct. at 682 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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Id. at 679.
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defamation suits without needing to prove actual malice.272 Thomas’s narrow focus on
libel laws specifically, rather than on the history and tradition of protecting speech critical
of the government more generally, might explain why he does not address in either
McKee or Berisha the jury’s acquittal of printer John Peter Zenger back in the 1730s, even
though Justice Thomas cited that case extensively in his McIntyre concurrence.273
Matthew Shaffer recently wrote an article attacking Justice Thomas’s historical
arguments in detail.274 Reviewing the history with that level of detail is beyond the scope
of this Article, but it should be noted that Shaffer argues that, in key respects, Justice
Thomas has overstated the historical record.275 For example, Shaffer asserts that the early
1800-era libel cases that Thomas cites fail to support his argument that the United States
embraced the English tradition; instead, Shaffer contends, they demonstrate precisely the
opposite, with courts attempting to reconcile libel law with a Republican form of
government.
In addition, even assuming state common law universally recognized strictliability or negligence defamation claims in 1791, it is not clear that it is the relevant
historical time period. Thomas himself recognizes the common law of defamation
evolved over time, and that by 1868 “many States by then allowed truth or good motives

272

Id. at 681.

273

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 361–62 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). See CLAY

CALVERT, DAN V. KOZLOWSKI & DERIGAN SILVER, MASS MEDIA LAW 41–42 (22nd ed. 2023) (providing a
synopsis of the arrest and prosecution of John Peter Zenger in the 1730s).
274

Matthew L. Schafer, In Defense: New York Times v. Sullivan, 82 LA. L. REV. 81 (2021).
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Schaffer concedes “not all of Thomas’s and Gorsuch’s historical authority can be swept away.” Id. at
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to serve as a defense.”276 To be sure, a defense is not the same as giving the plaintiff the
burden of proof, but it nevertheless undermines the argument that an actual malice
requirement is inconsistent with history and tradition. It thus becomes important to
determine whether the relevant historical time period is 1791, when the First Amendment
was ratified, or 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. As discussed
above,277 the Court expressly dodged this issue in its recent decisions.
Another difficulty the Court would face in reconsidering Sullivan is figuring out
how to interpret the history and tradition of defamation law as a whole, when the history
and tradition of the common law defamation is different throughout the fifty States. State
common law is full of privileges for otherwise defamatory speech, and these privileges
developed as a result of a perceived need to protect public discourse.278 As Matthew
Schafer argues, “libel law in the United States is not now, nor ever way, tidy. And the
history of the First Amendment, let alone the Fourteenth, is not a monolith.”279
Sullivan critics like Thomas appear to suggest that it is wrong for the Court to
interfere in any way with the common law tort of defamation. But as Richard Epstein
once wrote, Alabama common law and, in particular, its application in Sullivan, was not
consistent with the common law of most other states. Surely it cannot be the case that
states are free to develop their common law in any way they please, shielded entirely
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McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 678 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
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See supra notes 210–213 and accompanying text.
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Enrique Armijo, Faint-Hearted First Amendment Lochnerism, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1377, 1427-28 (2020) (noting

the common law of privacy and defamation “is itself limited in speech-favorable ways”); Epstein, supra note
245 (“the common law operates from a deep conviction in the importance of freedom of speech”).
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Schafer, supra note 274, at 97.
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from constitutional scrutiny.280 Although Thomas asserts that “States are perfectly
capable of striking an acceptable balance between encouraging robust public discourse
and providing a meaningful remedy for reputational harm,”281 Sullivan itself
demonstrates this is not the case.282 At the same time, determining a single, coherent
history and tradition of defamation law becomes exceedingly difficult when the states
had radically different laws, and the potentially relevant historical period sweeps broadly
from pre-colonial England to modern times.283
Similarly, it is worth noting that while Thomas has focused his ire on the actual
malice standard, in Sullivan the Court could have ruled in favor of the New York Times on
other grounds that also involved constitutionalizing a state-law tort. Although
determining the precise contours of a text, history, and tradition approach to these
questions is beyond the scope of this Article, it is at least plausible that this methodology
would have supported a decision for the newspaper. For example, it was hardly obvious
that the general statements in the challenged advertisement were “of and concerning”
plaintiff Sullivan. Likewise, the advertisement, while containing errors, was (at least
arguably) substantially true. Other holdings, such as one that the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving falsity, might not have made a difference in Sullivan but would impact
defamation litigation more generally.284
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See Epstein, supra note 245, at 790–91 (“The states cannot, either through their courts or their legislatures,

circumvent the constitutional prohibitions by deft manipulations of common law rules.”).
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McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 676 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
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See Levine & Wermiel, supra note 265, at 22.
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In sum, exactly how the Court would decide if it revisited the actual malice rule of
Sullivan largely depends on answers to knotty methodological questions about the First
Amendment’s text, history, and tradition approach that the Court has yet to answer.

IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court placed a heightened emphasis during its 2021 term on the
role that text, history, and tradition—originalism, in short—should play in resolving
questions affecting both First Amendment and Second Amendment rights.285 At the same
time, it jettisoned the means-end tests of strict and intermediate scrutiny in Second
Amendment cases, and it scuttled the means-end standard from Lemon v. Kurtzman in
Establishment Clause disputes.286
Significantly, Justice Thomas and the majority believed that the Court’s newfound
approach in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen for evaluating Second
Amendment issues was in harmony with the Court’s extant First Amendment freespeech framework.287 As Justice Breyer pointed out in Bruen and as this Article elaborated
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See supra notes 1–39 and accompanying text (addressing the various uses of or references to text, history,

and tradition in cases including New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, Shurtleff v. City of Boston,
Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, and Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization); see also Stephen F.
Rohde, Triumph of Originalism Over Human Dignity, 45 L.A. LAW. 22, 25 (Sept. 2022) (noting that the Court
in Bruen “relied on originalism to strike down New York’s concealed weapon law”).
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See supra notes 5–7 and notes 22–29 accompanying text (addressing, respectively, the demise of means

ends scrutiny in Bruen and the end of the Lemon test).
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See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, (2022) (asserting that the Court’s “Second

Amendment standard accords with how we protect other constitutional rights,” including “for instance,
the freedom of speech in the First Amendment”).
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on, however, that simply is not the situation because free-speech cases regularly pivot on
the application of means-end tests while Bruen explicitly rejects them.288
This Article explored what might happen if the Court’s conservative majority were
to more fully impose its Bruen framework on speech cases under the First Amendment.
It illustrated several problems that almost certainly would arise, from discerning what
the word “speech” in the First Amendment covers from a plain-text perspective to
fathoming whether modern-day regulations of speech might be sufficiently analogous to
or different from historical and traditional regulations of speech.
Ultimately, deploying Bruen’s methodology on free-speech cases probably would
severely hamper the ability of government to enact new regulations on speech. As Dean
Erwin Chemerinsky notes, the Court in Bruen “made it very difficult for governments at
all levels to enact gun regulations, holding that they are allowed only if they were a type
that historically existed in 1791 or perhaps 1868.”289 For instance, a federal district court
used Bruen’s methodology to enjoin a Texas statute barring “law-abiding 18-to-20-yearolds from carrying a handgun in public for self-defense.”290 There seemingly is little
reason to doubt that the difficulty in fashioning new rules governing firearms would also
arise for creating new rules affecting speech.
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Some might consider it purely speculative whether the originalistic text, history,
and tradition methodology of Bruen—one devoid of strict and intermediate scrutiny tests
–would ever fully migrate to the realm of free-speech cases.291 What is almost certain,
however, is that the six-Justice conservative majority in Bruen will have the opportunity
to do so if it desires over the next decade.292 This Article illustrates why the majority
should be more than a little bit chary of doing so.293
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The speculative nature of this issue arises because originalism—setting aside Justice Thomas’s approach

–currently plays little role in First Amendment free-speech jurisprudence. See Michael T. Cahill et al.,
Transcript, The Roberts Court and Free Speech Symposium, 87 BROOKLYN L. REV. 289, 294 (2021) (quoting First
Amendment scholar Ronald K.L. Collins for the proposition that “practically speaking, originalism
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jurisprudence”).
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